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Institutional incentives for strategic 
voting and party system change 
in Portugal*
Thomas Gschwend University of Mannheim
Abstract
Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible 
outcome of the ejection in their electoral district 1 will provide evidence for the 
first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems 
with large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal Employing district-level data 
from 1975-20021 estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be 
strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number 
does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district Neverthe­
less even in Portugal’s largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be 
observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares. Moreover there is 
evidence that strategic voting can partly account for the majoritarian trend that 
can be observed within the Portuguese party system.
Relevance of strategic voting in Portugal
Do voters in Portugal try to avoid wasting their vote on uncompetitive 
parties? The Portuguese electoral system is known to be one of the most 
disproportional PR list systems in Europe (Freire 2006). Thus, votes of 
large parts of the electorate are apparently cast for parties that do not gain 
representation in parliament. This has, of course, important implications 
for the responsiveness of the political system. The signal voters can send by 
casting their votes for particular parties might be seriously biased in the 
aggregate after the translation into legislative seats. Only certain parties 
will be able to influence both agenda and the policy-making process in 
parliament and, therefore, are able to make transparent these signals.
Although we know that naively applying behavioural theories without 
reference to the institutional embeddedness of the act of voting is miscon­
ceived, for the case of Portugal it seems safe to assume that most voters 
cast a sincere vote-that is, they vote for their most preferred party. These 
voters are motivated by expressive concerns, to make their votes count 
instead of ensuring that their votes actually count. Conversely, strategic 
voters in Portugal trying to avoid wasting their vote cast their votes for 
another party than their most preferred one if they thus expect it to be 
more likely to influence the outcome of the race in their electoral district.
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They make sure that their vote counts, as opposed to being merely counted 
by casting a sincere vote. Even a small number of strategic voters in PR 
systems might have a large impact on the election outcome in their 
electoral district, though. Moreover, a small number of voters might also 
determine the fate of a particular coalition government. Over time, strategic 
voting might also cause small parties to eventually fall by the wayside. Thus 
studying strategic voting seems to be a priori relevant for the study of party 
systems and its consolidation even in PR systems such as in Portugal.
The incentive structure
What are the incentives that the electoral systems provide to voters to deviate 
from their most preferred party? In general, in PR systems even marginal 
parties have chances to gain seats and to represent the opinions of their 
voters. Therefore, such an electoral system does not provide strong incentives 
for marginal party supporters to cast a strategic vote. The comparative litera­
ture on electoral systems argues, going back at least to Leys (1959) and 
Sartori (1968), that the smaller the district magnitude is-that is, the fewer 
seats are awarded at the electoral district level-the stronger the incentives to 
vote strategically. Although this hypothesis is developed to asses the incentives 
across a variety of electoral systems, it should also apply to electoral systems 
that do not award the same number of seats at every electoral system.
The electoral institutions in Portugal are particularly interesting in 
that regard. Since 1975 the range of the district magnitude has been rather 
wide. Across all 20 electoral districts and all elections between 1975 and 
2002 the district magnitude ranges from a minimum of three (Portalegre 
since 1985, Beja since 1999 and Evora since 2002) to a maximum of 58 
(Lisbon in 19 76). Given the Leys-Sartori conjecture is supported, we should 
expect to find more strategic voting the smaller the district magnitude. 
Nevertheless, the literature claims that strategic voting supposedly fades 
out when district magnitude is greater than five because the informational 
requirements for voters become too high in order to realise the incentives 
that are provided in districts with a large district magnitude (Cox 1997: 
100; Cox and Shugart 1996; Sartori 1968: 279). Simply put, it is (too) 
difficult for voters to figure out which party is marginal. Thus they cannot 
systematically try to avoid wasting their vote. Evidence to support this 
claim is stemming from ]apanese and Colombian district-level results (Cox 
1997: Chapter 5, Cox and Shugart 1996) as well as electoral returns in 
Spanish districts (Cox 1997: 115-117, Gunther 1989). At first sight, this 
argument seems plausible. Nevertheless the question, then, is, why forming 
expectations suddenly becomes so difficult that, according to this line of 
reasoning, one expects some strategic voting in districts with magnitude 
four but no longer in districts with district magnitude six and higher.
My argument will be that the literature does not provide sufficiently 
solid microfoundations for macro-level relationships between electoral 
system characteristics and implications of the nature of party systems, 
such as conditions under which certain parties are strategically deserted.
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To understand the influence of institutional incentives that are at work, 
one has to look more closely at the decision-making process of voters.
Micro-foundation and the role of expectations
Following the wasted-vote logic, strategic voters in Portugal vote for another 
party than their most preferred one if they thus expect it to be more likely 
to influence the outcome of the race in their electoral district. Thus, besides 
party preferences the main factor that proves to be important for an 
individual’s decision-making process are subjective expectations-whether 
a vote for someone’s most preferred party will be wasted. If we are willing 
to assume that voters try to maximise their expected utility from voting 
then we can conceptualise the expected utility in the following way: every 
voter derives a higher utility from voting for a particular party the more 
this party is preferred over any other party, assuming that this party gains 
a seat in the voter’s electoral district in the first place. However, without 
gaining any seat in the voter’s electoral district, the utility derived from a 
wasted vote for this party will be much smaller-or even zero-if the voter 
is not expressively motivated.1 Since not all parties will necessarily gain a 
seat in the voter’s electoral district, the additional utility a voter derives 
from voting for a party that gains a seat in the voter’s electoral district is 
uncertain. Thus the expected utility a voter derives from voting for a party 
is the product of the utility, given that this party will gain at least a seat in 
the voter’s electoral district, weighted by the voter's expectation that this 
party will actually gain at least a seat.
How do voters form these expectations? There are at least two conceiv­
able processes: on the one hand, independent of which party is most 
preferred, the larger the district magnitude the lower the threshold for any 
party to gain seats and thus the higher their supporters expectation that 
their vote will not be wasted (Sartori 1968: 279)-consequently, voters 
should be more aware that they potentially waste their vote in smaller dis­
tricts than in larger districts because parties, and the media are more likely 
to highlight this effect in smaller than in larger districts.
On the other hand, independent of the district magnitude of voters' 
electoral district, even inattentive voters - as ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991) - are likely to employ heuristics, such as the electoral history 
heuristic (Gschwend 2004) to generate reasonable expectations whether 
their most preferred party is able to win a seat in their electoral district. 
Although the process of expectation formation is unobservable, this 
heuristic implies that voters’ expectation whether their most preferred 
party will gain a seat in their electoral district in the upcoming election 
should be much higher if this party has previously gained a seat in this 
district. The consequences of employing this heuristic to generate expecta­
tions are independent from characteristics of the electoral district. It 
should not be harder for voters in Lisbon (large district) than for voters in 
Beja (small district), since they only care about the prospects of their most 
preferred party. Thus, contrary to the reasoning in the literature (Cox and
The voter could derive 
a non-zero utility 
from wasting the vote 
simply for expressive 
reasons, i.e., because 
he or she feels good 
about voting for (e.g., 
in order to build or 
maintain a firm 
political identification 
that simplifies the 
political realm) or 
against a particular 
party.
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Shugart 1996: 311; Cox 1997: 100), voters might even cast a strategic 
vote in large districts, given that they expect their most preferred party not 
to gain representation in their electoral district.
To sum up, there is a process at the district level, which characterises the 
nature of the district race. The potential for any vote to be wasted is a priori 
higher in smaller districts than in larger ones. Thus, political parties and the 
media should be all the more motivated to make voters aware of the wasted- 
vote context in smaller districts. Thus, this process facilitates voters to form 
clear expectations. Although the average voter might be more aware of the 
possibility to waste their vote, there is a second process at the individual- 
level. Voters have to asses whether their most preferred party will gain a seat 
in their electoral district in the upcoming election. Since both processes 
operate at different levels simultaneously, they presumably interact.
Because these processes are unobservable, I will focus on their observ­
able implications at the district-level in order to derive hypotheses about 
their consequences for what is politically relevant: party vote shares and 
ultimately, party system change. If voters expect their most preferred party 
to gain no seat, they should desert this party and vote strategically for 
another party in order to avoid wasting their vote. Thus, above and beyond 
the normal level of support one otherwise expects, parties in danger of not 
winning representation should get punished by strategic desertion and lose votes 
to parties that are expected to gain seats. Moreover, both processes, which 
facilitate voters to form expectations about the possibility of wasting their 
vote on their most preferred party, should interact. Thus, parties in danger 
of not winning representation should get punished more by strategic desertion- 
and consequently perform worse the smaller the district magnitude is. Conversely, 
parties not in danger of losing representation will benefit from strategic voting in 
such districts. In addition to the votes of their loyal supporters, these parties 
are favoured by strategic voters who try to avoid wasting their vote.
Party vote shares and strategic voting
Since I traced observable implications of the unobservable expectation 
formation process to the district-level to predict party vote shares, I will 
use district level results for all parties from 1975-2002 in order to test my 
hypotheses (see Table 1).
Following the presumed logic laid out previously, voters can only form 
expectations about the possibility that their vote might be wasted if the 
party they prefer has contested the same electoral district in the previous 
election. Thus, my theory cannot predict party vote shares for the first 
election a party does contest a particular electoral district. Nevertheless, I 
will end up with N = 1477 cases of parties contesting one of 20 electoral 
districts. Even a party's election result of the first time it contests a partic­
ular district is relevant in two ways for my analysis, though.
First, what would happen if voters do not care about forming expecta­
tion and try to avoid wasting their votes? They simply cast their votes for 
the party they favour most. The observational implication of this at the
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Party 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002
PS 20 20 20 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
FRS 18
UEDS 18
PPD+PPD/PSD 20 20 2 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
CDS+CDS-PP 20 20 2 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
AD 18 18
PPM 12 20 16 20 20 13 16
CDU 20
PCP-PEV 20 20 20 20
APU 20 20 20 20
PCP 20 20
MDP+MDP/CDE 20 20
BE 20 19
BE-UDP 1
UDP 10 19 20 20 17 20 20 2 20
PSR 20 20 17 20 19 20 20
PCTP/MRPP 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
PCP-ML 14
MRPP 20
PDC - RIGHT 17 17 19 19 20 20
MPT - RIGHT 5 20 19
PPM-MPT - RIGHT 6
PDA - RIGHT 6 3 11 3 1
PNR - RIGHT 6
PSN - RIGHT 19 13 15
POUS - LEFT 5 20 20 20 7 6 8
OCMLP - LEFT 5 5 13
PRD - LEFT 20 20 20
PCR - LEFT 17 17
AOC - LEFT 18
FEC - LEFT 12
FER - LEFT 5
FSP - LEFT 15 18
LCI - LEFT 4 18
1ST-LEFT 19
MES - LEFT 14 20
PH - LEFT 7 18
UDPSR - LEFT 3
PRT - LEFT 4
PT - ? 20
PUP - ? 7
PG-? 8
MUT-? 4
Table 1: Number of electoral districts a party did contest
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district level would be that party vote shares are predictable by past perfor­
mances in that district. Thus, I take a party’s previous vote share in a 
given district as a measure of the normal vote baseline (normal vote) a 
party could reasonably expect. Such a measure of the latent level of 
sincere party support is necessary to not falsely overestimate the effect of 
strategic voting for (or against) a party in a given district. At the same 
time, it is a very conservative measure since it assumes that everybody 
voted sincerely the previous time. This measure, therefore, potentially 
underestimates the number of strategic votes.
Second, in order to form an expectation of whether a vote for the most 
preferred party is wasted, a typical voter following the electoral history 
heuristic will look back at the previous election result: how many seats did 
a party get previously? The voter will be more likely to cast a strategic vote 
if their most preferred party did not get any seat the last time in a given 
district. Thus, in order to test the hypothesis that parties expected to be in 
danger of not winning representation should get deserted by strategic 
voters, we include a dummy variable (expectation) that scores ‘1’ in a given 
district if a party had gained no seat in the previous election in that dis­
trict. The distribution of this variable across parties is shown in Table 2.
There is considerable variance across parties. Apart from the 18 dis­
tricts the AD did contest in 1980, all parties in Portugal have at least once 
contested an electoral district without winning a single seat there before. 
Parties in such districts are likely to be strategically deserted at the next 
election by some of their supporters because they expect their vote to be 
wasted. Conversely, there are apparently several parties who have never 
managed to win even a single seat in an electoral district. The support of 
these parties should diminish over time, or their supporters derive a partic­
ular high utility based on either expressive motifs or to secure side-benefits 
(such as financial compensation), from wasting their vote on these parties.
To test the second hypothesis that parties in danger of not winning 
representation perform worse while parties who are expected to gain seats 
should benefit from strategic voting, the smaller the district magnitude is, 
one has to account for the size of the district magnitude (M) in the model. 
It is likely that the marginal impact of district magnitude M on party vote 
shares at the district level diminishes if M gets larger (Monroe and Rose 
2002; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Therefore, I logistically transform 
the district magnitude (log(M)) to account for that. To test for the condi­
tionality of the hypothesised strategic desertion effect a product term with 
expectation will be necessary.
Finally, I also include time fixed-effects (Years) into the model since I 
will combine party vote shares from all elections to be as encompassing as 
possible and, at the same time, without violating the unit homogeneity 
assumption for pooling data.
The standard dependent variable in the literature, the effective number of 
parties, as an aggregate measure of the nature of district party competition,
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Party
No. electoral districts party 
did won a seat previous 
election [Expectation =  0]
No. electoral districts party 
did not won a seat previous 
election [Expectation =  1] Sum
AD 18 0 18
APU 36 24 6 0
BE 1 18 19
CDS 51 53 104
CDS-PP 17 23 4 0
PSP 0 15 15
la 0 4 4
MES 0 14 14
MPT 0 24 24
OCMLP 0 10 10
OCP 9 11 20
PCP-PEV 19 41 60
PCR 0 17 17
pctp/ mrpp 0 160 1 6 0
pda 0 12 12
PDC 0 92 92
PH 0 7 7
POUS 0 66 66
PPD 17 3 20
ppd/psd 122 2 124
PPM 0 97 97
PRD 18 22 4 0
PS 181 1 182
PSN 1 27 28
PSR 0 116 116
UDP 4 124 128
Total 4 9 4 983 1 ,4 77
Table 2: Crucial districts across parties.
does not directly reflect my predictions-namely the amount of strategic 
voting that favours or penalises certain parties. This might be the primary 
reason why previous studies about strategic voting in Portugal failed to 
provide any evidence of strategic voting (Jalali 2002, cited in Freire 2006). 
Thus, contrary to previous research, a more appropriate candidate for a 
dependent variable, Y, is the district-level share of parties contesting a par­
ticular district. The general specification of the model is as follows:
Y = & 0  + &1 -NORMAL VOTE + bj ’ log(M) &3 ‘ EXPECTATION 
+ b4 ‘ log(M) EXPECTATION + YEARS + e
If parties are expected to not gain any seat, that is if the expectation scores 
‘1’ we get:
Y= (bo + 63) + bi ■ norm al vote + (bz+b4) - log(M)+Years + e
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Independent Variables
Dependent variable: party vote shares 
Restricted model Full model
Coeff. Std. Err. p-value Coeff. Std. Err. p-value
N o r m a l  V ote 0.894 0.019 0.000 0.881 0.020 0.000
1 n(M) *** -0.009 0.004 0.026
Expectation -0,027 0.008 0.000 -0.050 0.013 0.000
Expectatson x ln(M) *** 0.008 0.004 0.031
Y ears
1976 0.004 0.005 0.450 0.004 0.005 0.379
1979 -0.023 0.006 0.000 -0.023 0.006 0.000
1980 -0.001 0.003 0.765 -0.001 0.003 0.837
1983 0.001 0.005 0.858 0.001 0.005 0.886
1985 -0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.020 0.003 0.000
1987 -0.001 0.004 0.813 -0.001 0.004 0.743
1991 0.006 0.004 0.171 0.006 0.004 0.156
1995 -0.003 0.010 0.737 -0.003 0.010 0.730
1999 -0.001 0.004 0.874 -0.001 0.004 0.868
Constant 0.031 0.008 0.000 0.054 0.013 0.000
N 14 77 14 77
# Clusters 286 286
R2 0.905 0.906
Root MSB 0.051 0.051
Table 3: Strategic desertion of party vote shares.
Table 3 shows the estimation OLS estimation results. All standard errors are 
clustered by party and electoral district to account for the non-independence 
in the data structure.
To evaluate the unconditional effect of expectations on the amount of 
strategic desertion of parties I first present the results of a restricted model, 
excluding the characteristics of the district magnitude. Not surprisingly, 
there is some kind of continuity when predicting a party’s vote share at 
the district level. At the electoral district level, apparently the strength of a 
party in the previous election is a reliable predictor of future election 
results. On average a given party can rely on almost 90 per cent of its pre­
vious support for the next election.
Moreover, as expected the coefficient of expectation is negative. This 
indicates that parties in districts where they have not won any seat in the 
previous election are predicted to loose on average almost 3 per cent com­
pared to those districts where their voters could expect the party to gain 
representation. Every party has die-hard supporters. Nevertheless above 
and beyond the normal vote baseline, these results indicate that on 
average three out of 100 of a party’s potential supporters behave strategi­
cally and desert their party if they expect their vote to be wasted.
The impact of strategic voting is also conditional on the size of the elec­
toral district. The estimation result of the full model does make transparent 
the empirical evidence to support this claim. As expected, the interaction
22 Thomas Gschwend
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Figure 1: The conditionally of the strategic desertion effect.
effect of expectation and district magnitude is significant. Thus the strategic 
desertion effect depends on the magnitude of the electoral district. To 
make transparent the conditionality and the size of this effect I calculate 
the causal effect of expectation depending on the district magnitude, as the 
difference of the predicted vote shares in a given electoral district a party has 
to expect if it failed to gain a seat in the previous election as compared to a 
situation where this party did gain a seat in the previous election, that is
Y(expectation =  1) -  ^(expectation =  0) =  f?3 + &4 * log(M)
Figure 1 makes transparent the conditionality of the strategic voting 
effect. The area between the 9 5 per cent-confidence intervals is shaded.
In Portugal's smallest electoral districts we find that more than four 
out of 100 supporters of any given party desert this party if they expect 
their votes to be wasted. The share of strategic voters for any given party 
will diminish the larger the district magnitude gets. Nevertheless, even in 
Lisbon, the largest electoral district in Portugal with a district magnitude 
of 48 (at the moment), the model will predict a small but systematic share 
of voters to cast a strategic vote.
Therefore, contrary to previous studies, there is conclusive evidence 
that there is some systematic strategic voting at the electoral district-level. 
Some Portuguese voters apparently try to avoid wasting their votes on 
small parties that are not expected to gain at least a seat in the voters’ 
electoral district. The systematic desertion of small parties at the electoral 
district is a proposed individual-level mechanism. The consequences of this 
mechanism for party system change at the macro-level will be discussed in 
the next section.
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Party system change and strategic voting
What are the consequences of strategic voting for the party system in 
Portugal? While the first democratic elections in Portugal have seen a 
rather fragmented party system accompanied with high cabinet instability, 
various observers agree that since 1987 there has been a majoritarian 
trend in the Portuguese party system since 1987 along with increasingly 
stable governments (Lobo 2001, Magone 1999, Freire 2006, Magalhaes 
2003). At first sight, institutional effects cannot explain this trend. As the 
electoral system has not changed much. Moreover, the electoral districts 
remained the same although the respective district magnitudes varied 
slightly over time. The size of parliament shrunk from 250 seats to 230 
(since 1991). Thus, given the stability of the institutional context, no large 
‘mechanical’ effect is to be expected that may explain this majoritarian 
trend. Nevertheless, strategic voting-as this paper argues-crucially 
depends on ‘psychological’ effects: that is, how voters form expectations 
about the outcome of an election. In order to help producing a majoritar­
ian trend, instrumental voters need to perceive the same parties as viable 
and, at the same time, expect their most preferred party to have little 
prospect of gaining representation or becoming part of the next govern­
ment. Instead of wasting their votes on their most preferred party, instru- 
mentally motivated voters try to make their vote count and cast a vote 
strategically for a less preferred but viable party. Thus, if strategic voting 
has the potential to at least partly explain why, since 1987, fewer parties 
earn more votes and small parties eventually winnow out, voters need to 
form similar expectations of which parties will gain seats in their district 
or who will be likely to be part of the next government. Using district- 
level data does not allow addressing this without making large assump­
tions. This should be done with individual-level data. The question 
whether voters strategically try to avoid wasting their vote are more 
likely to influence the race in their electoral district has been addressed 
above.
Although voters are apparently more likely to expect their votes to be 
wasted the smaller the magnitude is in their electoral district, the differ­
ence between large and small magnitudes is less interesting than the effect 
of expectations itself. Thus, in the following section I will focus on the 
effect of Expectation at the district level: that is, the effect that parties 
which had gained no seat in the previous election will loose votes in the 
subsequent election. The proposed underlying mechanism generating this 
effect is that voters expect those parties to unable to win a seat in their 
electoral district. A first indication that strategic voting could be a candi­
date to explain why there has been a majoritarian trend in the Portuguese 
party system since 1978, the effect of Expectation should be higher since 
1987 compared to previous elections. This can be tested by including the 
dummy variable 1987 and later into the model, scoring 1 for every obser­
vation since 1987 and 0 otherwise, together with a product term with 
Expectation. Consequently, if strategic voting of this type is higher since
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Dependent variable: party vote shares
Baseline Model Full Model
Independent variables Coeff. Std. Err. p-value Coeff. Std. Err. p-value
NORMAL VOTE 0.895 0.020 0.000 0.871 0.020 0.000
Expectation -0.011 0.006 0.059 0.003 0.008 0.727
1987 AND LATER 0.025 0.006 0.000 0.020 0.008 0.013
Expectation  X  1987 a n d  later -0.028 0.006 0.000 -0.023 0.008 0.004
LEARNING 0.005 0.002 0.012
Expectation  X  lea rn ing -0.004 0.002 0.020
Contam ination 0.033 0.006 0.000
Expectation  x  Co n ta m in a t io n -0.030 0.006 0.000
Constant 0.013 0.006 0.022 -0.002 0.008 0.825
N 1477 1477
# Clusters 286 286
R2 0.905 0.907
Root MSE 0.051 0.051
Table 4: Strategic desertion and party system change.
1987, I expect the interaction effect Expectation x 1987 and later to be 
significantly negative. Moreover, as before, one still has to control for the 
share of the vote (Normal vote) a party could normally expect to gain in 
order to not falsely overestimate the effect of strategic voting. Thus, the 
model to analyse the impact of strategic voting for party system change 
becomes:
Y = bo+ bi' NORMAL VOTE + b2 * EXPECTATION + fa ' 1987 AND LATER 
+ ’ EXPECTATION X 1987 AND LATER + e
Table 4 shows the OLS estimation results. All standard errors are clustered 
by party and electoral district to account for the non-independence in the 
data structure.
Strategic voting seems to be of more importance in elections held since 
1987, while the role expectations play for the vote shares of parties that 
have not been able to win at least one seat in the previous election in a 
particular district is only marginally significant and small in absolute 
terms (about one percentage point) before 1987. Compared to elections up 
to 1985, the effect of strategic voting increases about 2.8 per cent. Since 
1987, averaged across all parties that have not been able to win at least 
one seat in the previous election, one has to expect that those parties be 
strategically deserted by almost 4 per cent of their voters - almost four 
times the respective effect in elections up to 1985.2
How can this be explained? All political actors have to learn how to 
most effectively play the rules of the game defined by the electoral system. 
Parties might consider bargaining for particular pre-electoral coalitions at
2 Since 1987 averaged 
across all parties 
which have not been 
able to win at least 
one seat in the 
previous election one 
has to expect that 
those parties gel 
strategically deserted 
by almost four 
percent of their voters 
(1.1 percentage points 
up to 1985 + an 
estimated increase of
2.8 percentage points 
results in an 
estimated effect of
3.9 percentage points) 
almost four times 
(3.9/1.1 = 3.5) the 
respective effect in 
elections up to 1985.
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the district-level if they have otherwise no chance of gaining a seat there. 
They can also fine-tune their campaigns-sending district-specific signals to 
their supporters. The media also has to learn how to cover interesting 
developments and tight races at the district-level in addition to the cam­
paign dynamics on the national scene. This way, the media can facilitate 
the formation of common voters’ expectations for every electoral district in 
which party can be deserted and is expected to gain seats. Finally, voters 
themselves have to learn how to avoid wasting their votes and, in order to 
do that, need to form expectations about the likely outcome of the district 
race. Thus, parties, the media and voters have to learn the implications of 
the electoral rules-and this, presumably, takes a while. The more often a 
party competes in an electoral district, the easier it should be for voters to 
form expectations whether or not a vote for this party is wasted. Although 
it might take a while (for instance, supporters of PCP took longer because 
of their strong social-structural anchoring (Gunther and Montero 2001: 
141) than those supporting the CDS. Small party supporters eventually 
learn that their votes are going to be wasted if their most preferred party 
has little chance of gaming at least a seat in the electoral district. Thus, in 
general, I expect parties where voters had the opportunity to learn forming 
expectations about the parties' electoral success to be more strategically deserted 
if those parties failed to gain representation in the previous election than in dis­
tricts where voters did not have the opportunity to learn forming expectations.
To operationalise this learning process as an opportunity to form 
common expectations, indicated by the variable Learning, I simply count 
the number of elections a party has competed in a particular electoral dis­
trict. The District Learning Hypothesis, then, is tested by also including the 
product term with Expectation in the model. Consequently, I expect a sig­
nificantly negative interaction term Expectation X  Learning .
Besides a district-specific learning effect that increases the substantive 
impact of strategic voting, the context of a particular parliamentary elec­
tion might also facilitates strategic voting if voters can easier form expecta­
tions and distinguish parties that are able to win seats in an electoral 
district from those parties that do not. In presidential election years, the 
electoral context of a campaign should be different from other election 
years. Presidential elections are held as a two-round majoritarian system; 
consequently supporters of small parties will have to eventually vote for 
another candidate anyway, since their party’s presidential candidate - if 
there is any - will have no chance to advance successfully to the second 
round of the election. For voters this can have two effects. First, some small 
party supporters might change their party preferences in favour of one of 
the main parties. This is not an unlikely scenario, particularly for many 
Portuguese voters given their relative weak ideological polarisation along 
the left-right cleavage compared to voters in other countries (Gunther and 
Montero 2001). Second, and less drastically, even if voters do not change 
their party preferences, their expectation formation process might never­
theless be particularly biased to reflect the strengths of parties at the
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national level rather than the strengths of parties on the district level, 
which is relevant for the distribution of parliamentary seats. The media 
may also systematically facilitate processes, since the focus of their presi­
dential election campaign coverage and the commentators will be on the 
major parties' candidates making it particularly hard for small parties to 
stay on-message even in the coverage of the parliamentary election cam­
paign. Under the pressure of a presidential election, parties might also be 
more likely to think harder about their local campaign strategies or be more 
likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties on the same ideo­
logical aisle (Freire 2006; Lobo 2001).
Given that presidential and parliamentary elections are held close 
together, the majoritarian tendency that is a concomitant phenomenon of a 
presidential election campaign should ‘contaminate’ (Shugart and Carey 
1992: 239-242) the context of a parliamentary election for parties, the 
media and voters. This contamination effect should facilitate voters to form 
common expectation. Therefore, I expect parties in ‘contaminated’ parliamen­
tary elections to be more strategically deserted if those parties failed to gain repre­
sentation in the previous election than in elections, where presiiteniiai and 
parliamentary elections are further apart. In order to operationalise the conta­
mination effect, I generate a dummy variable, Contamination, scoring 1, if 
presidential and parliamentary elections are held in the same election year. 
In those years, contamination should be greatest - no matter whether pres­
idential or parliamentary elections are held first: the context through 
which voters form their expectations is contaminated in either case. The 
Contamination Hypothesis, then, is tested by also including the product term 
with Expectation into the model. Consequently, I expect a significantly nega­
tive interaction term Expectation x  Contamination.
Both hypotheses relate strategic voting to party system change because 
they enable voters to form common expectations at the district level of 
which parties will be able to gain seats and which might partially explain 
why fewer parties earn more votes and small parties eventually winnow 
out. If those hypothesised factors account completely for the increased 
importance of strategic voting since 1987, then the interaction effect of 
Expectation X Contamination should no be longer significant. In order to 
estimate a full model, I simply add the variables needed to test those two 
additional hypotheses to the baseline model. Consequently the full model 
becomes:
Y = bo + h  ■ NORMAL VOTE + 62 * EXPECTATION + b3 ‘ 1987  AND LATER
+ f>4 • Expectation X 19 8 7 and la te r  + • Learning 
+ i?4 * Expectation X  Learning + h  • Contam ination 
+ i?4 • Expectation X  Contam ination + e
The OLS estimation results are presented in Table 4. Again, all standard 
errors are clustered by party and electoral district to account for the non­
independence in the data structure.
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Figure 2: Strategic desertion and learning.
Table 4 makes transparent that strategic voting has at least some 
potential to explain why some parties will gain more votes over time while 
others winnow out. As expected, both hypothesised interaction effects are 
significantly negative. Since the substantive interpretation of the condi­
tional effects is particularly difficult I present the size of the estimated 
causal effect of strategic desertion, ^ (expectation =  1) -  ^ expectation = 0), 
based on the full model in Table 4 graphically in Figure 2. The area 
between the 95 per cent-confidence intervals is shaded.
The size of the causal effect of strategic desertion defines the vertical 
axes of all four panels in this figure-that is, the amount of strategic deser­
tion averaged across all parties and all electoral districts a party has to 
expect if it failed to gain a seat in the previous election as compared to a 
situation where this party did gain a seat in the previous election. The size 
of the casual effect depends on the number of elections a party did 
compete in an electoral district (Learning) that defines the horizontal axes 
in all four panels. Based on the full model, four different scenarios have to 
be distinguished: whether one focuses on strategic voting since 1987 or 
before 1987 (left versus right column), or whether one is interested in 
effects of strategic voting in ‘contaminated’ versus other election years 
(upper versus lower row). Note that the number of cases differs across 
those four scenarios, and results are only presented if they actually occur 
in the data set-for instance, parties are able to compete in more successive 
elections at the district level since 1987 than before.
In all four panels we can see the predicted upward trend, indicating 
that parties have to expect a greater loss due to strategic desertion the
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more often they compete there. The slope of those predicted scenarios is 
largest (in absolute terms) for observations in 1991 (i.e. observations in 
election years since 1987 in which presidential elections were also held). 
Based on these results, we would expect to see even stronger desertion of 
small parties if presidential and parliamentary elections were be held in 
the same year sometime in the future. Furthermore, the simulated 
results of the lower right panel make an interesting feature of the learn­
ing effect of strategic voting transparent. In elections before 1987, 
where presidential elections were not held in the same year and if 
the number of elections a party competes is at most three, all respective 
95 per cent-confidence intervals include the 0 per cent-line. Thus, the 
strategic desertion effect apparently takes at least four successive elec­
tions before voters learn how to avoid wasting their votes. In the period 
since 1987, as can be seen in the lower left panel, voters systematically 
desert hopeless parties in a given electoral district after the second suc­
cessive competition.
To sum up, strategic voting even seems to have more impact on party 
vote shares since 1987. It can partially explain why-particularly since 
1987-fewer parties earn more votes and small parties eventually winnow 
out. Nevertheless, looking at the significant Expectation X  1987 and later 
effect, neither proposed processes-a learning process at the electoral district 
level or a contamination effect, nor the combination of both processes does 
fully accounts for the majoritarian trend since 1987.
Conclusion
Contrary to previous studies, I provide evidence for the case of Portugal 
that-despite weak institutional incentives-strategic voting is observable 
across all electoral districts. These incentives constrain an individual’s 
decision-making process. The argument I developed here is that institu­
tional incentives have an impact on the way voters form expectations 
about the outcome of upcoming elections. These incentives get channeled 
through the district: the situation in small districts is consequently differ­
ent from large districts. Nevertheless, there is also a second process at 
work that has an impact on the way voters form expectations. Parties 
expected to be in danger of not winning representation get punished by 
strategic desertion - less so the larger the district magnitude is. Overall, 
the model predicts that almost 3 per cent of each party’s vote share is lost 
due to strategic voting if voters do not expect a party to win at least a 
single seat in that electoral district. This number is highest (over 4 per 
cent) in Portugal’s smallest electoral districts. Nevertheless, in all existing 
electoral districts the results indicate some non-trivial amount of loss due 
to strategic voting. Parties that are expected to win representation benefit 
from the strategic votes of those voters who try to avoid wasting their votes 
on their most preferred party. In this sense, these findings echo results 
from a comparable study on strategic voting using district-level data from 
Finland (Gschwend and Stoiber 2005).
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A major alternative argument to the one proposed here would be if the 
voters do not react strategically to the institutional incentives of the elec­
toral system, but merely the party elites. Strategic behaviour of parties is 
all the more likely if, on the one hand, there are strong party organisations 
firmly anchored in Portuguese society and, on the other hand, if voting 
behaviour is easily predictable at the district level. While the latter seems 
to be the case given the high coefficient of the normal vote baseline in the 
model, the former criteria seems not to hold. There is a proliferation of 
parties which come and go, rename themselves or coalesce with others. 
Clearly a more detailed study at the party level is needed in order to esti­
mate the impact of strategic party behaviour. Nevertheless, the amount of 
strategic voting estimated here is a conservative since the strategic behav­
iour of party elites-building pre-electoral coalitions in order to maximise 
their prospects of getting seats in a particular district-does pre-empts 
strategic behaviour on side of the voters, since a vote for a pre-electoral 
coalition of parties is more likely not to be wasted.
Beside the theoretical interest in the evidence of strategic voting, 
particularly in an institutional context such as in Portugal, with large 
electoral districts, what is the impact of strategic voting for the party 
system? Particularly striking is the majoritarian trend in the Portuguese 
party system since 1987. The results are consistent with predictions that 
are generated by two different mechanisms: on the one hand, small parties 
winnow out, particularly in electoral districts where voters had the oppor­
tunity to learn forming expectations about the parties’ electoral success 
because the party is regularly competing there. On the other hand, small 
parties winnow out and get particularly hurt by contamination effects 
associated with the majoritarian character of the presidential electoral 
campaigns when parliamentary and presidential elections are held in the 
same yean Nevertheless, more research is needed, particularly through 
making creative use of survey data to better account for the majoritarian 
trend of the party system. Strategic voting has only some potential to 
partly explain the concentration of the party system in Portugal since 19 8 7.
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